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The humbling of Goldman Sachs
高盛 —— 走下神坛
Being good in a bad industry is not enough
在一个糟糕的行业里，仅仅做得不错是不够的
导读：认识高盛
Thirteen years ago, when Rolling Stone described Goldman Sachs as a “great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money” the description stuck, not just because it was vivid, but because it was a little bit true. Goldman made pots of money, more than anyone else on Wall Street. After the global financial crisis of 2007-09, most of the big financial institutions that survived were left licking their wounds, paying back bail-outs and pleading for forgiveness. Not Goldman: in 2009 it raked in $13.4bn in profits, its best year ever at the time and a record that stood for more than a decade.
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13年前（2010年），《滚石》杂志将高盛（Goldman Sachs）描述为“一只吸血的人面大章鱼，把吸血触手无情的伸进任何有金钱味道的地方”。这种描述之所以深入人心，不仅仅是因为它生动，还因为它有一点真实。高盛赚得盆满钵满，比华尔街的任何人都多。在2007-09年的全球金融危机之后，大多数幸存下来的大型金融机构只能舔着伤口，偿还救助资金，乞求原谅。高盛并非如此：2009年，高盛实现了134亿美元的利润，这是高盛有史以来业绩最好的一年，创下了超过10年的记录。（文本来源：本期《经济学人》深度报道《吸血章鱼》）
Goldman Sachs has always seen itself as exceptional. When the bank floated its shares in New York in 1999 it declared: “We have an uncompromising determination to achieve excellence in everything we undertake.” Conspiracy theorists have long paid it the backhanded compliment of imagining that it secretly runs the world. Yet lately the only exceptional thing about the Wall Street icon has been its mistakes.
高盛始终认为自己卓尔不凡。1999年这家银行在纽约上市时宣布：“我们的决心毫不妥协，就是要在我们所做的每一件事上都取得卓越的成就。”长期以来，阴谋论者一直在暗地里恭维它，认为它在秘密地操纵着世界。然而最近，这位华尔街偶像唯一卓尔不凡的是它所犯下的错误。
Since October, Goldman has made a U-turn on its plan to build a big consumer bank; booked one of its worst quarterly results for a decade, measured by return on equity; and attracted a probe by the Federal Reserve. The firm is not yet in serious trouble, but it is trapped by its own mythology. Its recent struggles show how hard it will be to reform—and illuminate a new balance of power in global finance.
自去年10月以来，高盛打造大型消费者银行的计划来了个180度大转弯；按股本回报率衡量，它的季度业绩是十年来最差之一；并招致美联储调查。虽然该公司还没有陷入严重困境，但它已被自己的神话所困。它最近的奋力挣扎表明，改革何其艰难，同时也证明，全球金融已形成新的力量平衡。
To understand Goldman today, take a walk down Wall Street. After the financial crisis of 2007-09, two big American banks reinvented themselves. JPMorgan Chase successfully pursued vast scale across a wide range of business lines. Morgan Stanley built a thriving arm managing the assets of the wealthy, which mints reliable profits. Goldman, however, stuck to its game of trading, advising on deals and bespoke investing. Penal new capital rules made this less lucrative, but the firm staked a Darwinian bet that the resulting shakeout would kill off many competitors. Instead, it badly underperformed the stockmarket for years and got ensnared in the 1MDB scandal, in which officials in Malaysia and Abu Dhabi received $1.6bn of bribes in 2009-14. A Goldman subsidiary pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and the firm admitted “institutional failure”.
要了解今天的高盛，我们不妨到华尔街走一走。发生2007—09年金融危机以后，美国两大银行对自己进行了彻底改造。摩根大通在广泛的业务范围成功地实现了大规模化。摩根士丹利建立了一个蓬勃发展的部门，以管理富人资产，创造可靠的利润。然而，高盛却坚持自己的交易游戏，为交易和定制投资提供咨询服务。惩罚性的新资本规则使得这一切无利可图，而该公司又押上了达尔文式的赌注（以生死为赌注——译者注），认为由此产生的重组将消灭许多竞争对手。相反，该银行多年来的股市表现严重逊于大盘，并陷入了1MDB丑闻（2018年，美国司法部起诉前高盛银行家莱斯纳、黄宗华，指控他们与一名马来西亚金融家勾结，从该国主权财富基金“一马发展有限公司”（1MDB）挪走了数十亿美元。受此丑闻影响，案件发布当日高盛股价暴跌7.46%，创下近两年来最大单日跌幅。——译者注）。在该丑闻中，马来西亚和阿布扎比的官员在2009-14年收受了16亿美元的贿赂。高盛的一家子公司对一项刑事指控供认不讳，该公司也承认存在“体制缺陷”。
The firm’s boss, David Solomon, took over in 2018. A man with a short fuse, he has tried to rebrand himself and to renew the firm by expanding its core and diversifying into new areas. Goldman now offers transaction banking to multinationals, helping them move funds globally. It has bulked up its asset- and wealth-management arm. And from their Manhattan skyscraper, flush Goldmanites dreamed of growing a mass-market digital bank for ordinary consumers, including a credit-card operation.
公司老板大卫·所罗门（David Solomon）于2018年接任。作为一个脾气暴躁的人，他试图重塑自我形象，并通过扩大核心业务和向新领域拓展使公司重新焕发生机。高盛现在为跨国公司提供交易银行业务，帮助它们将资金转移到全球。它已经扩充了资产和财富管理部门。在曼哈顿的摩天大楼里，暴富的高盛人梦想着为普通消费者建立一个面向大众市场的数字银行，包括信用卡业务。
Parts of Mr Solomon’s strategy have paid off. Goldman’s market share in mergers and bond trading has risen, helping it make a monster $21bn in profits in 2021 as markets boomed. From taxpayers’ viewpoint, it is safer, with more capital and deposits. And, importantly, its share price has recovered lost ground, rising more than the market and those of most of its peers.
所罗门的部分策略已经得到了回报。高盛在并购和债券交易方面的市场份额有所上升，帮助其在2021年市场繁荣期创造了210亿美元的巨额利润。从纳税人的角度来看，它更安全，有更多的资本和存款。而且，重要的是，它的股价收复了失地，涨幅超过了市场和大多数同行。
Yet look more closely and the project to remake the bank is vexingly incomplete. Diversification has been patchy: transaction-banking revenues are tiny and the asset-management arm is often dragged down by opaque proprietary bets. The dream of creating a consumer bank has soured. Goldman has 15m customers, but has also faced large losses and bad-debt charges, which is why it is now winding down part of the operation.
然而，仔细观察就会发现，改造银行的计划还未完成，这令人恼火。业务多元化一直是参差不齐的：交易银行业务收入很小，资产管理部门经常被不透明的自营业务拖累。创建消费者银行的梦想已经破灭。高盛拥有1500万客户，但也面临着巨额亏损和坏账指控，这也是它现在正逐步缩减部分业务的原因。
As the prospects for a big new earnings machine have receded, everything still rests on the traditional business. The profitability of the trading arm has improved but remains volatile and, on average, pedestrian. Overall, Goldman has made reasonable use of its resources, generating a return on tangible equity of 14% over Mr Solomon’s tenure. But its performance is erratic, veering from 33% in early 2021 to just 5% in the latest quarter. It has lagged behind its American peers half of the time, and the two industry leaders, JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley, two-thirds of the time. Investors think that Goldman is worth only the net book—or liquidation—value of its assets, suggesting they doubt that it can generate consistently high returns or find lucrative new areas.
随着大型新盈利机器前景的日益暗淡，一切仍取决于传统业务。交易部门的盈利能力有所改善，但仍然不稳定，平均而言，乏善可陈。总的来说，高盛合理利用了自己的资源，在所罗门任职期间，高盛的有形股本回报率达到了14%。但它的表现不稳定，从2021年初的33%跌至最近一个季度的5%。有一半的时间落后于美国同行，有三分之二的时间落后于两大行业领导者摩根大通和摩根士丹利。投资者认为高盛只值其资产的净账面价值（或清盘价值），这表明他们怀疑高盛能否创造持续的高回报或找到有利可图的新领域。
Goldman’s struggles point to several lessons. One is that it still excels, but in a bad industry. Investment banking combines the drawbacks of a regulated activity (capital requirements and red tape) with the vices of a speculative one (volatility and capture by employees). The firm says it has become more disciplined on pay but last year forked out $15bn, its second-highest salary and bonus bill since the financial crisis, even as profits halved to $11bn and the firm barely beat its cost of capital. The real action in finance is outside regulated banking, where a new cohort of stars rules, including Blackstone in private markets, BlackRock in index funds, and Citadel, an investing and trading house that made its clients $16bn in 2022.
高盛的挣扎得出了几个教训。第一，它做得还算不错，但这个行业太糟糕。投资银行兼有监管活动和投机活动的双重缺点——前者的资本要求与繁文缛节；后者的波动性和被员工绑架。该公司表示，它在薪酬上变得更加自律，但去年支付了150亿美元，是自金融危机以来第二高的薪酬和奖金，尽管该公司利润减半至110亿美元且仅略高于资本成本。真正的金融行动是在受监管的银行业之外，一批新星占据支配地位，包括私人市场的黑石（Blackstone）、指数基金的贝莱德（BlackRock），以及投资和交易公司城堡（Citadel），该公司在2022年为其客户创造了160亿美元的收入。
Another lesson is that it is hard to compete in winner-takes-all digital markets. Goldman thought that brains and brand were enough. Not true. It has spent billions, but its customer base remains a fraction of that of PayPal or Amazon. JPMorgan reaches 66m American households, but maintains a vast physical network of branches. Goldman has achieved digital scale by teaming up with Apple to provide a credit card. However, given that the tech giant has almost a billion paying subscribers, Apple holds the whip hand in that relationship.
另一个教训，是在赢家通吃的数字市场上很难取得竞争优势。高盛认为，有头脑和品牌就足够了。但实际上并非如此。它已经花费了数十亿美元，但它的客户群仍然只占贝宝（PayPal）或亚马逊（Amazon）的一小部分。摩根大通（JPMorgan）的业务覆盖了6600万美国家庭，同时维持着一个庞大的分行实体网络。通过与苹果（Apple）合作提供信用卡业务，高盛已经实现了数字化规模。然而，鉴于这家科技巨头拥有近10亿付费用户，苹果在这一关系中掌握了主动权。
A final lesson is that the stagnation of globalisation has shrunk Wall Street’s horizons. In the decade after Goldman listed, international revenues provided half of its growth, as its bankers conquered Europe and then broke into Asia. Today they supply a third of growth, as local competitors have emerged and some countries have become wary of foreign financiers. The number-one arranger of shares and bonds last year in China was CITIC Securities; in India Kotak Mahindra and Axis led the pack. These are names that many on Wall Street may not know.
最后一个教训是，全球化的停滞使华尔街的视野变得狭窄。在高盛上市后的十年里，国际收入贡献了其一半的增长，因为它的银行家占领了欧洲，然后进军亚洲。如今，随着本土竞争者的出现，以及一些国家对外国金融家的警惕，它们仅提供了三分之一的增长。去年（2022年），中信证券（CITIC Securities）是中国股票和债券的头号承销商；而在印度，科塔克马亨德拉（Kotak Mahindra）和安讯士（Axis）则是领头羊。这些名字可能很多华尔街人士都没有听说过。
Raging bulls
愤怒的公牛
Can Goldman recover its swagger? Mr Solomon is wisely laying off staff and shrinking the bank’s proprietary investments. Over time he may be vindicated by prosaic changes—running its asset-management arm better, say, or pioneering new tech to cut exorbitant labour costs—or even by orchestrating a merger.
高盛能恢复它过去的十足神气吗？所罗门正在明智地裁员并缩减银行的自营投资。随着时间的推移，他可能会通过一些平淡无奇的改变来证明自己的正确性——比如更好地运营其资产管理部门，或者开创新技术以削减过高的劳动力成本——甚至通过精心策划一场并购。
Yet there is something uniquely hard about reforming elite firms whose unwritten code is that they are smarter than everyone else. Just ask McKinsey, a scandal-magnet once known as the world’s most-admired consultancy. Goldman’s culture of self-regard remains at odds with the facts. Instead, it now needs to be self-critical. For yesterday’s masters of the universe, that may be the hardest leap of all.
然而，改革精英公司谈何容易，因为这里的不成文法则是没有人更聪明。只要问问麦肯锡，这家丑闻磁铁曾经被称为世界上最受尊敬的咨询公司。高盛自视甚高的文化仍然与事实不符。相反，现在需要自我批判。对于昨天的宇宙主宰者来说，这可能是最艰难的一次飞跃。
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